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War and Misperception War has so many causes-in part 
because there are so many kinds of wars-and misperception has 
so many effects-again in part because there are so many kinds 
of misperceptions-that it is not possible to draw any definitive 
conclusions about the impact of misperception on war.1 But we 
can address some conceptual and methodological problems, note 
several patterns, and try to see how misperceptions might lead to 
World War III. In this article, I use the term misperception 
broadly, to include inaccurate inferences, miscalculations of con- 
sequences, and misjudgments about how others will react to one's 
policies. 
Although war can occur even when both sides see each other 
accurately, misperception often plays a large role. Particularly 
interesting are judgments and misjudgments of another state's 
intentions. Both overestimates and underestimates of hostility 
have led to war in the past, and much of the current debate about 
policy toward the Soviet Union revolves around different judg- 
ments about how that country would respond to American pol- 
icies that were either firm or conciliatory. Since statesmen know 
that a war between the United States and the Soviet Union would 
be incredibly destructive, however, it is hard to see how errors 
of judgment, even errors like those that have led to past wars, 
could have the same effect today. But perceptual dynamics could 
cause statesmen to see policies as safe when they actually were 
very dangerous or, in the final stages of deep conflict, to see war 
as inevitable and therefore to see striking first as the only way to 
limit destruction. 
POSSIBLE AREAS OF MISPERCEPTION Although this article will 
concentrate on misperceptions of intentions of potential adversar- 
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ies, many other objects can be misperceived as well. Capabilities 
of course can be misperceived; indeed, as Blainey stresses, exces- 
sive military optimism is frequently associated with the outbreak 
of war.2 Military optimism is especially dangerous when coupled 
with political and diplomatic pessimism. A country is especially 
likely to strike if it feels that, although it can win a war imme- 
diately, the chances of a favorable diplomatic settlement are slight 
and the military situation is likely to deteriorate. Furthermore, 
these estimates, which are logically independent, may be psycho- 
logically linked. Pessimism about current diplomatic and long- 
run military prospects may lead statesmen to exaggerate the pos- 
sibility of current military victory as a way of convincing them- 
selves that there is, in fact, a solution to what otherwise would 
be an intolerable dilemma. 
Less remarked on is the fact that the anticipated consequences 
of events may also be incorrect. For example, America's avowed 
motive for fighting in Vietnam was not the direct goal of saving 
that country, but rather the need to forestall the expected reper- 
cussions of defeat. What it feared was a "domino effect" leading 
to a great increase in Communist influence in Southeast Asia and 
the perception that the United States lacked the resolve to protect 
its interests elsewhere in the world. In retrospect, it seems clear 
that neither of these possibilities materialized. This case is not 
unique; states are prone to fight when they believe that "band- 
wagoning" rather than "balancing" dynamics are at work-that 
is, when they believe that relatively small losses or gains will set 
off a self-perpetuating cycle. In fact, such beliefs are often incor- 
rect. Although countries will sometimes side with a state which 
is gaining power, especially if they are small and can do little to 
counteract such a menace, the strength and resilience of balancing 
incentives are often underestimated by the leading powers. States- 
men are rarely fatalistic; they usually resist the growth of domi- 
nant powers.3 A striking feature of the Cold War is how little 
2 For a discussion of the concept of intentions in international politics, see Jervis, Per- 
ception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, I976), 48-57. For a discussion 
of the meaning of that concept in general, see Gertrude E. M. Anscombe, Intention (Ithaca, 
1969); Ernest May, "Conclusions: Capabilities and Proclivities," in idem (ed.), Knowing 
One's Enemies (Princeton, I984), 503. A. Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War (New York, 
I973). 
3 See Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration (Baltimore, 1962), 122-24; Kenneth 
Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass., I979); Stephen Walt, "Alliance 
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each side has suffered when it has had to make what it perceived 
as costly and dangerous retreats. 
At times we may need to distinguish between misperceptions 
of a state's predispositions-that is, its motives and goals-and 
misperceptions of the realities faced by the state. Either can lead 
to incorrect predictions, and, after the fact, it is often difficult to 
determine which kind of error was made. When the unexpected 
behavior is undesired, decision-makers usually think that they 
have misread the other state's motives, not the situation it faced.4 
Likewise, scholars generally focus on misjudgments of intentions 
rather than misjudgments of situations. We, too, shall follow this 
pattern, although it would be very useful to explore the propo- 
sition that incorrect explanations and predictions concerning other 
states' behaviors are caused more often by misperceptions con- 
cerning their situations than by misperceptions about their pre- 
dispositions. 
WAR WITHOUT MISPERCEPTION It has often been argued that, 
by definition, the proposition is true that every war involves at 
least one serious misperception. If every war has a loser, it would 
seem to stand to reason that the defeated state made serious 
miscalculations when it decided to fight. But, whereas empirical 
investigations reveal that decisions to go to war are riddled with 
misperceptions, it is not correct that such a proposition follows 
by definition. 
A country could rationally go to war even though it was 
certain it would lose. First, the country could value fighting itself, 
either as an ultimate goal or as a means for improving man and 
society. Second, faced with the choice of giving up territory to a 
stronger rival or losing it through a war, the state might choose 
war because of considerations of honor, domestic politics, or 
international reputation. Honor is self-explanatory, although, like 
the extreme form of Social Darwinism alluded to earlier, it sounds 
strange to modern ears. Domestic politics, however, are likely to 
remain with us and may have been responsible for at least some 
Formation and the Balance of World Power," International Security, IX (1985), 3-43; idem, 
The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, I987). 
4 For a good review, see Edward Jones, "How Do People Perceive the Causes of 
Behavior?" American Scientist, LXIV (1976), 300-305. For an analysis of related phenomena 
in international politics, see Jervis, Perception and Misperception, 343-354. 
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modern wars. It is a commonplace that leaders may seek "a quick 
and victorious war" in order to unify the country (this sentiment 
is supposed to have been voiced by Vyacheslav Plehve, the Rus- 
sian minister of the interior on the eve of the Russo-Japanese 
War), but statesmen might also think that a short, unsuccessful 
war might serve the same function. 
Although examples seem rare, international considerations 
could also lead a statesman to fight a war he knows he will lose. 
The object would be to impress third countries. Such a decision 
might appear particularly perverse because a loss would seem to 
show that the country is weak. But more important than the 
display of its lack of military capability could be the display of its 
resolve, if not foolhardiness. Other nations which had quarrels 
with the state might infer that it is willing to fight even when its 
position is weak, and such an inference might strengthen the 
state's bargaining position.5 
Only rarely can statesmen be certain of a war's outcome, and 
once we take the probabilistic nature of judgments into consid- 
eration, it is even more clear that one can have wars without 
misperception. A state may believe that the chances of victory are 
small and yet rationally decide to fight if the gains of victory are 
large and the costs of losing are not much greater than those of 
making the concessions necessary to avoid war. 
Although a state could start a war that it had little prospect 
of winning solely because of the attractions of victory, psychology 
and politics both conspire to make it much more likely that states 
go to war because of their gloomy prognostications of what will 
happen if they do not fight. Psychologically, losses hurt more 
than gains gratify. Both domestic and international politics pro- 
duce a similar effect. Public opinion and partisan opposition is 
more easily turned against a government which seems to be sac- 
5 This concept is similar to the economist's notion of the "chain store paradox." It 
applies in cases in which the state can prevail in the conflict, but only at a cost which 
exceeds the immediate gains. The reason for fighting in this case is again to impress other 
potential challengers, and the analogy is the behavior of a large chain store toward small 
stores which challenge it by cutting prices. The chain store can respond by cutting prices 
even more, thus losing money but succeeding in driving the competitor out of business. 
The point of taking such action is to discourage other challengers, but the paradox is that 
in each particular case the chain store loses money and the tactic will be effective only if 
others believe it will be repeated. See Reinhard Selten, "The Chain Store Paradox," Theory 
and Decision, IX (1978), I27-I59. 
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rificing existing values than one which is not expanding the coun- 
try's influence rapidly enough. Analyses of international politics 
reinforce these pressures. Statesmen are generally slower to be- 
lieve that the domino effect will work for them than against them. 
They realize that other states will often respond to their gains by 
attempting to block further advances; by contrast, they also be- 
lieve that any loss of their influence will lead to a further erosion 
of their power. 
Because a state which finds the status quo intolerable or 
thinks it can be preserved only by fighting can be driven to act 
despite an unfavorable assessment of the balance of forces, it is 
neither surprising nor evidence of misperception that those who 
start wars often lose them. For example, Austria and Germany 
attacked in 1914 largely because they believed that the status quo 
was unstable and that the tide of events was moving against them. 
As Sagan shows, the Japanese made a similar calculation in 1941.6 
Although they overestimated the chance of victory because they 
incorrectly believed that the United States would be willing to 
fight-and lose-a limited war, the expectation of victory was 
not a necessary condition for their decision to strike. According 
to their values, giving up domination of China-which would 
have been required in order to avoid war-was tantamount to 
sacrificing their national survival. Victory, furthermore, would 
have placed them in the first rank of nations and preserved their 
domestic values. The incentives were somewhat similar in I904, 
when they attacked Russia even though "the Emperor's most 
trusted advisers expressed no confidence as to the outcome of the 
war. . . . The army calculated that Japan had a fifty-fifty chance 
to win a war. The Navy expected that half its forces would be 
lost, but it hoped the enemy's naval forces would be annihilated 
with the remaining half. "7 Fighting was justified in light ofJapan's 
deteriorating military position combined with the possibility of 
increasing its influence over its neighbors. 
METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS The most obvious way to deter- 
mine the influence of misperception on war would be to employ 
6 Scott D. Sagan, "The Origins of the Pacific War," Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 
XVIII (1988), 893-922. 
7 Shumpei Okamoto, The Japanese Oligarchy and the Russo-Japanese War (New York, 
I970), IOI. 
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the comparative method and contrast the effects of accurate and 
inaccurate perceptions. But several methodological problems 
stand in the way. First is the question of whether perceptions 
should be judged in terms of outcomes or processes-that is, 
whether we should compare them to what was later revealed to 
have been reality or whether we should ask how reasonable were 
the statesmen's inferences, given the information available at the 
time. The two criteria call for different kinds of evidence and 
often yield different conclusions.8 People are often right for the 
wrong reasons and, conversely, good analyses may produce an- 
swers which later will be shown to have been incorrect. Shortly 
after Adolf Hitler took power, Robert Vansittart, the permanent 
undersecretary of the British Foreign Office, concluded that the 
Germans would increase their military power as rapidly as pos- 
sible in order to overturn the status quo. In criticizing military 
officials, who generally disagreed with him, he said: "Prophecy 
is largely a matter of insight. I do not think the Service Depart- 
ments have enough. On the other hand they might say I have too 
much. The answer is that I knew the Germans better."9 His image 
of Hitler was quite accurate, but it is not clear that he reached it 
by better reasoning or supported it with more evidence than did 
those who held a different view. 
A second difficulty is that historians and political scientists 
are drawn to the study of conflict more often than to the analysis 
of peaceful interactions. As a result, we know little about the 
degree to which harmonious relationships are characterized by 
accurate perceptions. I suspect, however, that they are the product 
of routinized and highly constrained patterns of interaction more 
often than the result of accurate perceptions. 
A third problem lies in determining whether perceptions 
were accurate, which involves two subproblems. First, it is often 
difficult to determine what a statesman's-let alone a country's- 
perceptions are. We usually have to tease the person's views out 
of confused and conflicting evidence and try to separate his true 
beliefs from those he merely wants others to believe he holds. 
8 Processes which seem highly rational may yield less accurate perceptions than those 
which are more intuitive. See Kenneth Hammond, "A Theoretically Based Review of 
Theory and Research in Judgment and Decision Making," unpub. ms. (Boulder, I986). 
9 Quoted in Donald Watt, "British Intelligence and the Coming of the Second World 
War in Europe," in May (ed.), Knowing One's Enemies, 268. 
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Indeed, in some cases the person initially may not have well- 
defined perceptions but may develop them to conform to the 
actions he has taken. 10 Second, even greater difficulties arise when 
the perceptions are compared with "reality." The true state of the 
military balance can be determined only by war; states' intentions 
may be impossible to determine, even after the fact and with all 
the relevant records open for inspection. 
Our ability to determine whether statesmen's assessments are 
accurate is further reduced by the probabilistic nature of these 
assessments. Statesmen often believe that a given image is the one 
most likely to be correct or that a given outcome is the one most 
likely to occur. But the validity of such judgments is extremely 
hard to determine unless we have a large number of cases. If 
someone thinks that something will happen nine out of ten times, 
the fact that it does not happen once does not mean that the 
judgment was wrong. Thus if a statesman thinks that another 
country probably is aggressive and we later can establish that it 
was not, we cannot be sure that his probabilistic judgment was 
incorrect.1T 
MISPERCEPTIONS AND THE ORIGINS OF WORLD WARS I AND II Trac- 
ing the impact of beliefs and perceptions in any given case might 
seem easy compared to the problems just presented. But it is not, 
although even a brief list of the misperceptions preceding the 
major conflicts of this century is impressive. Before World War 
I, all of the participants thought that the war would be short. 
They also seem to have been optimistic about its outcome, but 
there is conflicting evidence. (For example, both Edward Grey 
and Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg made well-known gloomy 
predictions, but it is unclear whether these statements accurately 
reflected their considered judgments. In addition, quantitative 
analysis of the available internal memoranda indicates pessimism, 
Io Daryl Bern, "Sef-Perception Theory," in Leonard Berkowitz (ed.), Advances in Ex- 
perimental Social Psycihoogy (New York, 1972), VI, t-62. For an application to foreign 
policy, see Deborah Larson, The Origins of Containment (Princeton, I985). 
I In politics, not only are situations rarely repeated, but the meaning of probabilistic 
judgments is not entirely clear. Are these statements merely indications of the degree to 
which the person feels he lacks important facts or an understanding of significant rela- 
tionships? Or do they reflect the belief that politics is inherently uncertain and that, if 
somehow the same situation was repeated in all its details, behavior might be different on 
different occasions? 
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although there are problems concerning the methodology em- 
ployed.12) 
May argues that the analyses of the intentions of the adver- 
saries during this period were more accurate than the analyses of 
their capabilities, but even the former were questionable.13 Some 
of the judgments of July 1914 were proven incorrect-for ex- 
ample, the German expectation that Britain would remain neutral 
and Germany's grander hopes of keeping France and even Russia 
out of the war. Furthermore, the broader assumptions underlying 
the diplomacy of the period may also have been in error. Most 
important on the German side was not an image of a particular 
country as the enemy, but its basic belief that the ensuing events 
would lead to either "world power or decline." For the members 
of the Triple Entente, and particularly Great Britain, the central 
question was German intentions, so brilliantly debated in Eyre 
Crowe's memorandum and Thomas Sanderson's rebuttal to it. 
We still cannot be sure whether the answer which guided British 
policy was correct.14 
The list of misperceptions preceding World War II is also 
impressive. Capabilities again were misjudged, although not as 
badly as in the previous era.15 Few people expected the blitzkrieg 
to bring France down; the power of strategic bombardment was 
greatly overestimated; the British exaggerated the vulnerability 
of the German economy, partly because they thought that it was 
stretched taut at the start of the war. Judgments of intention were 
even less accurate. The appeasers completely misread Hitler; the 
anti-appeasers failed to see that he could not be stopped without 
a war. For his part, Hitler underestimated his adversaries' deter- 
mination. During the summer of 1939 he doubted whether Britain 
would fight and, in the spring of 1940, expected her to make 
peace. 16 
12 See Ole Holsti, Robert North, and Richard Brody, "Perception and Action in the 
1914 Crisis," inJ. David Singer (ed.), Quantitative International Politics (New York, 1968), 
I23-I58. 
13 May, "Conclusions," 504. For a more detailed discussion of May's argument, see 
Jervis, "Intelligence and Foreign Policy," International Security, XI (I986/87), 141-61. 
14 This continuing debate also underlies the difficulty of determining when perceptions 
are misperceptions. Indeed, when we contemplate the task of avoiding World War III, it 
is disheartening to note that we cannot even be sure how the participants could have 
avoided World War I. 
15 See May (ed.), Knowing One's Enemies, 237-30I, 504-519. 
I6 This belief may not have been as foolish as it appears in retrospect. While France was 
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It might also be noted that in both cases the combatants paid 
insufficient attention to and made incorrect judgments about the 
behavior of neutrals. To a large extent, World War I was decided 
by the American entry and World War II by the involvement of 
the Soviet Union and the United States.17 But we cannot gener- 
alize from these two examples to say that states are prone to make 
optimistic estimates concerning the role of neutrals; it may be 
equally true that pessimistic judgments may lead states to remain 
at peace, and we would have no way of determining the validity 
of such assessments. 
DID THE MISPERCEPTIONS MATTER? But did these misperceptions 
cause the wars? Which if any of them, had they been corrected, 
would have led to a peaceful outcome? In attempting to respond 
to such questions, we should keep in mind that they are hypo- 
thetical and so do not permit conclusive answers. As Stein has 
noted, not all misperceptions have significant consequences.18 
If Britain and France had understood Hitler, they would have 
fought much earlier, when the balance was in their favor and 
victory could have been relatively quick and easy. (Managing the 
postwar world might have been difficult, however, especially if 
others-including the Germans-held a more benign image of 
Hitler.) If Hitler had understood his adversaries, the situation 
would have been much more dangerous since he might have 
devised tactics that would have allowed him to fight on more 
favorable terms. But on either of these assumptions, war still 
would have been inevitable; both sides preferred to fight rather 
than make the concessions that would have been necessary to 
maintain peace.19 
falling, the British Cabinet spent two days debating whether to open talks with Germany. 
See Philip M. H. Bell, A Certain Eventuality (Farnborough, Eng., I974), 31-54; Martin 
Gilbert, Winston Churchill, VI: Finest Hour, 1939-1941 (London, 1983), 402-425. Given 
the situation Britain faced, seeking peace might have been reasonable. See David Reynolds, 
"Churchill and the British 'Decision' to Fight on in 1940: Right Policy, Wrong Reason," 
in Richard Langhorne (ed.), Diplomacy and Intelligence during the Second World War (Cam- 
bridge, I985), I47-67. 
I7 The role of states which are not involved in the first stages of combat is stressed by 
Blainey, Causes of War, 57-67, 228-242; Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, The War Trap (New 
Haven, 1981). 
I8 Arthur Stein, "When Misperception Matters," World Politics, XXXIV (I982), 505- 
526. 
I9 Oddly enough, almost the only view of Hitler which indicates that he could have 
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The case of 1914 is not as clear. I suspect that the mispercep- 
tions of intentions in July, although fascinating, were not crucial. 
The Germans probably would have gone to war even if they had 
known that they would have had to fight all of the members of 
the Triple Entente. The British misjudgment of Germany-if it 
were a misjudgment-was more consequential, but even on this 
point the counterfactual question is hard to answer. Even if Ger- 
many did not seek domination, the combination of her great 
power, restlessness, and paranoia made her a menace. Perhaps a 
British policy based on a different image of Germany might have 
successfully appeased the Germans-to use the term in the older 
sense-but Britain could not have afforded to see Germany win 
another war in Europe, no matter what goals it sought. 
Capabilities were badly misjudged, but even a correct appre- 
ciation of the power of the defense might not have changed the 
outcome of the July crisis. The "crisis instability" created by the 
belief that whoever struck first would gain a major advantage 
made the war hard to avoid once the crisis was severe, but may 
not have been either a necessary or a sufficient condition for the 
outbreak of the fighting. The Germans' belief that time was not 
on their side and that a quick victory would soon be beyond their 
reach was linked in part to the mistaken belief in the power of 
the offensive, but was not entirely driven by it. Thus, a preventive 
war might have occurred in the absence of the pressures for 
preemption. 
Had the participants realized not only that the first offensive 
would not end the war, but also that the fighting would last for 
four punishing years, they might well have held back. Had they 
known what the war would bring, the kaiser, the emperor, and 
the czar presumably might have bluffed or sought a limited war, 
but they would have preferred making concessions to joining a 
general struggle. The same was probably true for the leaders of 
Britain and France, and certainly would have been true had they 
known the long-term consequences of the war. In at least one 
sense, then, World War I was caused by misperception. 
been deterred is that of Taylor, who paints a picture of the German leader as an opportunist, 
inadvertently misled by the acquiescence of Western statesmen (Alan J. P. Taylor, The 
Origins of the Second World War [New York, I961]). 
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MODELS OF CONFLICT Two possible misperceptions of an ad- 
versary are largely the opposites of each other, and each is linked 
to an important argument about the causes of conflict. On the 
one hand, wars can occur if aggressors underestimate the willing- 
ness of status quo powers to fight (the World War II model); on 
the other hand, wars can also result if two states exaggerate each 
other's hostility when their differences are in fact bridgeable (the 
spiral or World War I model). These models only approximate 
the cases that inspired them. As noted earlier, World War II would 
have occurred even without this perceptual error, and the judg- 
ments of intentions before 1914 may have been generally accurate 
and, even if they were not, may not have been necessary for the 
conflict to have erupted. Nevertheless, the models are useful for 
summarizing two important sets of dynamics. 
The World War II model in large part underlies deterrence 
theory. The main danger which is foreseen is that of an aggressive 
state which underestimates the resolve of the status quo powers. 
The latter may inadvertently encourage this misperception by 
errors of their own-for example, they may underestimate the 
aggressor's hostility and propose compromises that are taken as 
evidence of weakness. In the spiral model, by contrast, the danger 
is that each side will incorrectly see the other as a menace to its 
vital interests and will inadvertently encourage this belief by re- 
lying on threats to prevent war, thereby neglecting the pursuit of 
agreement and conciliation. 
As I have stated elsewhere, the heated argument between the 
proponents of the two models is not so much a dispute between 
two rival theories as it is a dispute about the states' intentions.20 
The nature of the difference of opinion then points up both the 
importance and the difficulty of determining what states' motives 
and goals are, what costs and risks they are willing to run in 
order to expand, and the likely way in which they will respond 
to threats and conciliation. Determining others' intentions is so 
difficult that states have resorted to an approach that, were it 
suggested by an academic, would be seen as an example of how 
out of touch scholars are with international realities. On several 
occasions, states directly ask their adversaries what it is they want. 
20 Jervis, Perception and Misperception, 58-I13. 
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The British frequently discussed directing such an inquiry to 
Hitler, and the United States did so to Joseph Stalin shortly after 
the end of World War II. Statesmen might be disabused of their 
misperceptions if they could listen in on their adversary's delib- 
erations. Thus in his analysis of the Eastern crisis of I887/88, 
Seton-Watson argues that Benjamin Disraeli's government greatly 
exaggerated the Russian ambitions, and points out that "it is 
difficult to believe that even the most confirmed Russophobe in 
the British Cabinet of those days could have failed to be reassured 
if it had been possible for him to [read the czar's telegrams to his 
ambassador in London]."21 But of course were such access pos- 
sible, it could be used for deception, and the information would 
therefore not be credible. 
It is clear that states can either underestimate or overestimate 
the aggressiveness of their adversaries and that either error can 
lead to war. Although one issue raised by these twin dangers is 
not central to our discussion here, it is so important that it should 
at least be noted. If the uncertainty about others' intentions cannot 
be eliminated, states should design policies that will not fail di- 
sastrously even if they are based on incorrect assumptions. States 
should try to construct a policy of deterrence which will not set 
off spirals of hostility if existing political differences are in fact 
bridgeable; the policy should also be designed to conciliate with- 
out running the risk that the other side, if it is aggressive, will be 
emboldened to attack. Such a policy requires the state to combine 
firmness, threats, and an apparent willingness to fight with reas- 
surances, promises, and a credible willingness to consider the 
other side's interests. But the task is difficult, and neither decision- 
makers nor academics have fully come to grips with it.22 
2I Robert W. Seton-Watson, Disraeli, Gladstone, and the Eastern Question (New York, 
1972), 127, 192. It is interesting to note that during and after World War II the Soviet 
Union did have high-level spies who had good access to American thinking. The more 
recent penetrations of the American Embassy in Moscow may have duplicated this feat. 
The results may not have been entirely deleterious-both the United States and the Soviet 
Union may gain if the latter has convincing evidence that the former is driven by defensive 
motivations. 
22 For a further discussion, seeJervis, Perception and Misperception, 0I9-1I3; idem, "De- 
terrence Theory Revisited," World Politics, XXXI (I979), 289-324; Richard Ned Lebow, 
"The Deterrence Deadlock: Is There a Way Out?" in Jervis, Lebow, and Janice Stein, 
Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore, I985), I80-202; Alexander George, David Hall, and 
William Simons, Coercive Diplomacy (Boston, 197I), IOO-IO3, 238-244; George and Rich- 
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The existence of a spiral process does not prove the appli- 
cability of the spiral model, for increasing tension, hostility, and 
violence can be a reflection of the underlying conflict, not a cause 
of it. For example, conflict between the United States and Japan 
increased steadily throughout the 1930s, culminating in the Amer- 
ican oil embargo in 1941 and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor 
four months later. Misperceptions were common, but the spiral 
model should not be used to explain these events because the 
escalating exchange of threats and actions largely revealed rather 
than created the incompatibility of goals. Japan preferred to risk 
defeat rather than forego dominance of China; the United States 
preferred to fight rather than see Japan reach its goal. 
Blainey advances similar arguments in his rebuttal of Higon- 
net's views on the origins of the Seven Years' War. Higonnet 
claims that "no one wanted to fight this war. It would never have 
occurred if, in their sincere efforts to resolve it, the French and 
English governments had not inadvertently magnified its insig- 
nificant original cause into a wide conflict."23 Hostilities escalated 
as Britain and France attempted to counteract (and surpass) each 
other's moves. They became increasingly suspicious of their ad- 
versary's motives, and felt that the stakes were higher than orig- 
inally had been believed. The cycle of action and threat perception 
eventually led both sides to believe that they had to fight a major 
war in order to protect themselves. Blainey's rebuttal is simple: 
what was at stake from the beginning was "mastery in North 
America." The initial moves were at a low level of violence 
because each side, having underestimated the other's willingness 
to fight, thought it was possible to prevail quickly and cheaply.24 
Resolving such differences would require detailed research and 
responses to a number of hypothetical questions. But it should 
be kept in mind that the existence of increasing and reciprocal 
hostility does not always mean that the participants have come to 
overestimate the extent to which the other threatens its vital 
interests. 
ard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy (New York, I974), 588-613; Glenn Snyder 
and Paul Diesing, Conflict among Nations (Princeton, I977), 489-493. 
23 Patrice Louis-Rene Higonnet, "The Origins of the Seven Years' War," Journal of 
Modern History, XL (I968), 57-58. See also Smoke, War (Cambridge, Mass., 1977), 195- 
236. 
24 Blainey, Causes of War, 133-134. 
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Furthermore, even if the initial conflict of interest does not 
justify a war and it is the process of conflict itself which generates 
the impulse to fight, misperception may not be the crucial factor. 
The very fact that states contest an issue raises the stakes because 
influence and reputation are involved. To retreat after having 
expended prestige and treasure, if not blood, is psychologically 
more painful than retreating at the start; it is also more likely to 
have much stronger domestic and international repercussions.25 
The dilemmas which are created were outlined in 1953 by the 
American intelligence community in a paper which tried to esti- 
mate how the Russians and Chinese would react to various forms 
of American military pressure designed to produce an armistice 
in Korea: 
If prior to the onset of any UN/U.S. military course of action, the 
Communists recognized that they were faced with a clear choice 
between making the concessions necessary to reach an armistice, 
or accepting the likelihood that UN/U.S. military operations 
would endanger the security of the Manchurian and Soviet borders, 
destroy the Manchurian industrial complex, or destroy the Chinese 
Communist armed forces, the Communists would probably agree 
to an armistice. However, it would be extremely difficult to present 
them with a clear choice of alternatives before such action was 
begun. Moreover, once such UN/U.S. action was begun, Com- 
munist power and prestige would become further involved, thereby 
greatly increasing the difficulties of making the choice between 
agreeing to [an] armistice or continuing the war.26 
ASSESSING HOSTILE INTENT On balance, it seems that states are 
more likely to overestimate the hostility of others than to under- 
estimate it. States are prone to exaggerate the reasonableness of 
their own positions and the hostile intent of others; indeed, the 
former process feeds the latter. Statesmen, wanting to think well 
of themselves and their decisions, often fail to appreciate others' 
perspectives, and so greatly underestimate the extent to which 
their actions can be seen as threats. 
25 One of the psychological mechanisms at work is cognitive dissonance. In order to 
justify the effort they are expending to reach a goal, people exaggerate its value. 
26 Department of State, Foreign Relatiotns of the United States, 1952-54. XV: Korea (Wash- 
ington, D.C., 1984), Pt. I, 888. 
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When their intentions are peaceful, statesmen think that oth- 
ers will understand their motives and therefore will not be threat- 
ened by the measures that they are taking in their own self- 
defense. Richard Perle, former assistant secretary of defense, once 
said that if we are in doubt about Soviet intentions, we should 
build up our arms. He explained that if the Russians are aggres- 
sive, the buildup will be needed, and, if they are not, the only 
consequence will be wasted money. Similarly, when United States 
troops were moving toward the Yalu River, Secretary of State 
Dean Acheson said that there was no danger that the Chinese 
would intervene in an effort to defend themselves because they 
understood that we were not a threat to them. Exceptions, such 
as the British belief in the I930s that German hostility was based 
largely on fear of encirclement and the Israeli view before the 
1973 war that Egypt feared attack, are rare.27 (The British and the 
Israeli perceptions were partly generated by the lessons they de- 
rived from their previous wars.) 
This bias also operates in retrospect, when states interpret 
the other side's behavior after the fact. Thus American leaders, 
believing that China had no reason to be alarmed by the move- 
ment of troops toward the Yalu, assumed the only explanation 
for Chinese intervention in the Korean War was its unremitting 
hostility to the United States. India, although clearly seeing the 
Chinese point of view in 1950, saw the Chinese attack on her in 
I962 as unprovoked, and so concluded that future cooperation 
was impossible. Similarly, although all Westerners, even those 
who could empathize with the Soviet Union, understand how the 
invasion of Afghanistan called up a strong reaction, Soviet leaders 
apparently did not and instead saw the Western response as "part 
of a hostile design that would have led to the same actions under 
any circumstances."28 
27 Daniel Yergin, "'Scoop' Jackson Goes for Broke," Atlantic Monthly, CCXXIII (I974), 
82. Perle, then an aide to Sen. Henry Jackson, is describing the latter's views, but what 
he says seems to apply to his own beliefs as well. Acheson's views are presented in John 
Spanier, The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War (New York, 1965), 97; 
Allen Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu (Stanford, 1968), I51. (Similar examples are dis- 
cussed inJervis, Perception and Misperception, 67-76.) The case of Israel in 1973 is analyzed 
in Janice Stein, "Calculation, Miscalculation, and Conventional Deterrence. II. The View 
from Jerusalem," in Jervis, Lebow, and Stein, Psychology and Deterrence, 60-88. See also 
Richard Betts, Surprise Attack (Washington, D.C., I982). 
28 Raymond Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation (Washington, D.C., 1985), 1076. 
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This problem is compounded by a second and better known 
bias-states tend to infer threatening motives from actions that a 
disinterested observer would record as at least partly cooperative. 
John Foster Dulles' view of Nikita Khrushchev's arms cuts in the 
mid-I95os is one such example and President Ronald Reagan's 
view of most Soviet arms proposals may be another.29 
These two biases often operate simultaneously, with the re- 
sult that both sides are likely to believe that they are cooperating 
and that others are responding with hostility. For example, when 
Leonid Brezhnev visited President Richard Nixon in San Clem- 
ente during 1973 and argued that the status quo in the Middle 
East was unacceptable, and when Andrei Gromyko later said that 
"the fire of war [in the Mid-East] could break out onto the surface 
at any time," they may well have thought that they were fulfilling 
their obligations under the Basic Principles Agreement to consult 
in the event of a threat to peace. The Americans, however, felt 
that the Soviets were making threats in the spring and violating 
the spirit of detente by not giving warning in the fall.30 
People also tend to overperceive hostility because they pay 
closest attention to dramatic events. Threatening acts often 
achieve high visibility because they consist of instances like crises, 
occupation of foreign territory, and the deployment of new weap- 
ons. Cooperative actions, by contrast, often call less attention to 
themselves because they are not dramatic and can even be viewed 
as nonevents. Thus Larson notes how few inferences American 
statesmen drew from the Soviet's willingness to sign the Austrian 
State Treaty of 1955.31 Similarly, their withdrawal of troops from 
Finland after World War II made little impact, and over the past 
29 See the classic essay by Holsti, "Cognitive Dynamics and Images of the Enemy: 
Dulles and Russia," in David Finlay, Holsti, and Richard Fagen, Enemies in Politics (Chi- 
cago, 1967), 25-96. Michael Sullivan, International Relations: Theories and Evidence (Engle- 
wood Cliffs, N.J., 1976), 45-46, questions the links between Dulles' beliefs and American 
behavior. 
30 Gromyko is quoted in Galia Golan, Yom Kippur and After (London, 1977), 68. The 
treatment of the 1973 war is a good litmus test for one's views on detente: compare, for 
example, the discussions in Harry Gelman, The Brezhnev Politburo and the Decline of Detente 
(Ithaca, I984), 135-139, 152-156; Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation; George, Managing 
U.S.-Soviet Rivalry (Boulder, I983), 139-154. 
31 Larson, "Crisis Prevention and the Austrian State Treaty," International Organization, 
XXXXI (I987), 27-60. 
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few years few decision-makers or analysts have commented on 
the fact that the Soviets have not engaged in a strategic buildup. 
MISPERCEPTION AND THE ORIGINS OF WORLD WAR III Mispercep- 
tion could prove to be an underlying cause of World War III 
through either the overestimation or the underestimation of hos- 
tile intent. If the Soviet Union is highly aggressive-or if its 
subjective security requirements can be met only by making the 
West insecure-then war could result through a Soviet underes- 
timation of American resolve. If the Soviet Union is driven pri- 
marily by apprehension that could be reduced by conciliation, 
then war could result through a spiral of threat-induced tensions 
and unwarranted fears. But, although it is easy to see how either 
of these misperceptions could increase conflict, it is hard to see 
how a nuclear war could start under current technology when 
both sides know how costly such a clash would be. To analyze 
this topic, concentrating on the role of misperception, we first 
examine the dynamics of the game of chicken and then discuss 
the psychological aspects of crisis stability and preemption. 
Misperception, Commitment, and Change In a situation that 
is similar to the game of chicken (that is, any outcome, including 
surrender, would be better than war), war should not occur as 
long as both sides are even minimally rational and maintain con- 
trol over their own behavior.32 Both sides may bluster and bluff, 
but it will make no sense for either of them to initiate all-out 
conflict. Each side will try to stand firm and so make the other 
back down; the most obvious danger would result from the mis- 
taken belief that the other will retreat and that it is therefore safe 
to stand firm. 
But if both sides maintain control, war can occur only if 
either or both sides become irrevocably committed to acting on 
their misperception. In other words, so long as either state retains 
its freedom of action, war can be avoided because that state can 
back down at the last minute. But commitment can inhibit this 
32 In fact, statesmen realize that large-scale conflict can result from confrontations even 
if they do not desire it. They then both fear and employ what Schelling calls "threats that 
leave something to chance" (Thomas Schelling, Strategy of Conflict [Cambridge, Mass., 
I960], 187-203). Under current circumstances, control may be hard to maintain in a crisis 
if the decision-makers delegate the authority to fire nuclear weapons to local commanders. 
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flexibility, and that, of course is its purpose. Standard bargaining 
logic shows that if one side persuades the other that it is com- 
mitted to standing firm, the other will have no choice but to 
retreat.33 What is of concern here is that this way of seeking to 
avoid war can make it more likely. 
Whether a commitment-and indeed any message-is per- 
ceived as intended (or perceived at all) depends not only on its 
clarity and plausibility, but also on how it fits with the recipient's 
cognitive predispositions. Messages which are inconsistent with 
a person's beliefs about international politics and other actors are 
not likely to be perceived the way the sender intended. For ex- 
ample, shortly before the Spanish-American War President Wil- 
liam McKinley issued what he thought was a strong warning to 
Spain to make major concessions over Cuba or face American 
military intervention. But the Spanish were worried primarily not 
about an American declaration of war, but about American aid 
for the Cuban rebels, and so they scanned the president's speech 
with this problem in mind. They therefore focused on sections 
of the speech that McKinley regarded as relatively unimportant 
and passed quickly over the paragraphs that he thought were 
vital.34 
Furthermore, the state sending the message of commitment 
is likely to assume that it has been received. Thus one reason the 
United States was taken by surprise when the Soviet Union put 
missiles into Cuba was that it had assumed that the Soviets under- 
stood that such action was unacceptable. Statesmen, like people 
in their everyday lives, find it difficult to realize that their own 
intentions, which seem clear to them, can be obscure to others. 
The problem is magnified because the belief that the message has 
been received and understood as it was intended will predispose 
the state to interpret ambiguous information as indicating that the 
other side does indeed understand its commitment. 
Psychological Commitment and Misperception Misperception 
can lead to war not only through mistaken beliefs about the 
33 Ibid., II9-I6I. 
34 May, Imperial Democracy (New York, I961), I6i. For an extended discussion of this 
problem, see Jervis, Perception and Misperception, 203-216; idem, "Deterrence Theory Re- 
visited," 305-3Io. For a discussion of this problem in the context of the limited use of 
nuclear weapons, see Schelling, "The Role of War Games and Exercises," in Ashton 
Carter, John Steinbruner, and Charles Zraket (eds.), Nuclear Operations and Command and 
Control (Washington, D.C., I987), 426-444. 
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impact of the state's policy of commitment on others, but also 
through the impact of commitment on the state. We should not 
forget the older definition of the term commitment, which is 
more psychological than tactical. People and states become com- 
mitted to policies not only by staking their bargaining reputations 
on them, but by coming to believe that their policies are morally 
justified and politically necessary. For example, the process of 
deciding that a piece of territory warrants a major international 
dispute and the effort that is involved in acting on this policy can 
lead a person to see the territory as even more valuable than he 
had originally thought. Furthermore, other members of the elite 
and the general public may become aroused, with the result that 
a post-commitment retreat will not only feel more costly to the 
statesman; it may actually be more costly in terms of its effect on 
his domestic power. 
Commitment can also create misperceptions. As the decision- 
maker comes to see his policy as necessary, he is likely to believe 
that the policy can succeed, even if such a conclusion requires the 
distortion of information about what others will do. He is likely 
to come to believe that his threats will be credible and effective 
and that his opponents will ultimately cooperate and permit him 
to reach his objectives. Facing sharp value trade-offs is painful; 
no statesman wants to acknowledge that he may have to abandon 
an important foreign policy goal in order to avoid war or that he 
may have to engage in a bloody struggle if he is to reach his 
foreign policy goals. Of course, he will not embark on the policy 
in the first place if he thinks that the other will fight. Quite often, 
the commitment develops incrementally, without a careful and 
disinterested analysis of how others are likely to react. When 
commitments develop in this way, decision-makers can find 
themselves supporting untenable policies that others can and will 
challenge. The result could be war because the state behaves more 
recklessly than the chicken context would warrant.35 
35 The literature on these perceptual processes, which are a subcategory of what are 
known as "motivated biases" because of the important role played by affect, is large. The 
best starting place is Irving Janis and Leon Mann, Decision Making (New York, 1977). For 
applications to international politics, see Richard Cottam, Foreign Policy Motivation (Pitts- 
burgh, I977); Lebow, Between Peace atnd War (Baltimore, I98I); Jervis, "Foreign Policy 
Decision-Making: Recent Developments," Political Psychology, II (I980), 86-IOI; idem, 
Lebow, and Stein, Psychology antd Deterrence. For earlier versions of the argument, see 
Holsti, North, and Brody, "Perception and Action," 123-158; Snyder, Deterrence and 
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The Ultimate Self-Fulfilling Prophecy Even if the processes 
of commitment can entrap statesmen, it is hard to see how World 
War III could occur unless one or both sides concluded that it was 
inevitable in the near future. As long as both sides expect that all- 
out war will result in unlimited damage, they will prefer peace 
to war. But if either thinks that peace cannot be maintained, the 
choice is not between maintaining peace-even at a significant 
cost in terms of other values-and going to war, but between 
striking first or being struck first. Even under these circumstances, 
attacking would make sense only if the former alternative is pref- 
erable to the latter. Since strategic weapons themselves are rela- 
tively invulnerable, scholars, until recently, have believed that 
there were few incentives to strike first. But they are now aware 
of the vulnerability of command, control, and communication 
(C3) systems which could lead decision-makers to believe that 
striking first would be at least marginally, and perhaps signifi- 
cantly, better than receiving the first blow.36 Preemption would 
be advantageous, thereby creating what is called crisis instability. 
Crisis instability is a large topic, and here it is addressed only 
in terms of the potential role of misperception.37 First, perceptions 
create their own reality. Determinations about the inevitability of 
war are not objective, but instead are based on each side's per- 
Defense (Princeton, I96I), 26-27. For a rebuttal to some points, see Sagan, "Origins of 
the Pacific War," 893-922. John Orme, "Deterrence Failures: A Second Look," International 
Security, XI (I987), 96-I24. For further discussion of the tendency to avoid trade-offs, see 
Jervis, Perception and Misperception. Quester points to the strategic value of commitment 
in making the other side retreat (Quester, "Crisis and the Unexpected," Journal of Inter- 
disciplinary History, XVIII [1988], 70I-719.). He is correct, but such behavior can still lead 
to war if the other side does not gauge the situation accurately. 
36 For further discussion of situations that could lead to World War III, see Warner 
Schilling et al., American Arms and a Changing Europe (New York, I973), 172-174, and 
George, "Problems of Crisis Management and Crisis Avoidance in U.S.-Soviet Relations," 
unpub. paper (Oslo, I985). C3 is discussed by Desmond Ball, Can Nuclear War Be Con- 
trolled? (London, 1981); Paul Bracken, The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces (New 
Haven, 1983); Bruce Blair, Strategic Command and Control (Washington, D.C., 1985); 
Carter, Steinbruner, and Zraket (eds.), Nuclear Operations. The resulting dangers are 
analyzed in Graham Allison, Albert Carnesale, and Joseph Nye (eds.), Hawks, Doves, and 
Owls (New York, 1985). The fundamental argument about "the reciprocal fear of surprise 
attack" was developed by Schelling in Strategy of Conflict, 207-229. 
37 For further discussion of some of the arguments being made here, see Jervis, The 
Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca, 1984); Lebow, Nuclear Crisis Management (Ithaca, 
1987); Jervis, "Psychological Aspects of Crisis Instability," in idem, The Implications of the 
Nuclear Revolution (forthcoming); idem, The Symbolic Nature of Nuclear Politics (Urbana, 
I987). 
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ceptions of what the other will do, which in turn is influenced by 
what each side thinks its adversary thinks that it is going to do. 
To maintain the peace, a state would have to convince the adver- 
sary that it will not start a war and that it does not believe the 
other will either. This interaction would take place within the 
context of a crisis of unprecedented severity, probably involving 
military alerts, if not the limited use of force. 
We know very little about how states in such circumstances 
would think about the problem, judge the adversary's behavior, 
try to reassure the adversary, and decide whether these reassur- 
ances had been believed. But however these analyses are carried 
out, they will constitute, not just describe, reality; the question 
of whether war is inevitable cannot be answered apart from the 
participants' beliefs about it. 
War itself would provide an objective answer to the question 
of whether there would be a significant advantage to striking first. 
But even here beliefs would play a role-the military doctrine 
adopted by a state and its beliefs about the other side's doctrine 
would strongly influence a decision to strike first. On the one 
hand, the incentives to strike first would remain slight so long as 
each side believed that the war would be unlimited, or, if con- 
trolled, would concentrate on attacks against cities. On the other 
hand, if each side believed that it was crucial to deny the other 
any military advantage, first-strike incentives would be greater 
because attacks against weapons and C3 systems might cripple the 
other's ability to fight a counterforce war, even if they could not 
destroy the other's second-strike capability. 
The uncertainties here, and in other judgments of the advan- 
tages of striking first, are enormous. Furthermore, they cannot 
be resolved without war. Thus statesmen's perceptions will in- 
volve both guesswork and intuition. In such circumstances, many 
factors could lead to an exaggeration of the benefits of taking the 
offensive.38 Military organizations generally seek to take the ini- 
tiative; statesmen rarely believe that allowing the other to move 
38 For a discussion of the operation of such factors in previous cases, see Jack Snyder, 
The Ideology of the Offensive (Ithaca, 1984); Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine 
(Ithaca, 1984). See also Sagan, "1914 Revisited: Allies, Offense, and Instability," Interna- 
tional Security, XI (I986), I5I-I76, and the exchange between Sagan and Jack Snyder, 
"The Origins of Offense and the Consequences of Counterforce," in International Security, 
XI (I986/87), I87-198. 
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first is beneficial; and the belief that war is inevitable could lead 
decision-makers to minimize psychological pain by concluding 
that striking first held out a significant chance of limiting damage. 
If war is believed to be very likely but not inevitable, launch- 
ing a first strike would be an incredible gamble. As noted at the 
start of this article, such gambles can be rational, but, even when 
they are not, psychological factors can lead people to take them. 
Although most people are risk-averse for gains, they are risk- 
acceptant for losses.39 For example, given the choice between a 
Ioo percent chance of winning $io and a 20 percent chance of 
winning $55, most people will choose the former. But if the 
choice is between the certainty of losing $io and a 20 percent 
chance of losing $55, they will gamble and opt for the latter. In 
order to increase the chance of avoiding any loss at all, people are 
willing to accept the danger of an even greater sacrifice. Such 
behavior is consistent with the tendency for people to be influ- 
enced by "sunk costs" which rationally should be disregarded and 
to continue to pursue losing ventures in the hope of recovering 
their initial investment when they would be better off simply 
cutting their losses. 
This psychology of choice has several implications concern- 
ing crisis stability. First, because the status quo forms people's 
point of reference, they are willing to take unusual risks to recoup 
recent losses. Although a setback might be minor when compared 
to the total value of a person's holdings, he will see his new status 
in terms of where he was shortly before and therefore may risk 
an even greater loss in the hope of reestablishing his position. In 
a crisis, then, a decision-maker who had suffered a significant, 
but limited, loss might risk world war if he thought such a war 
held out the possibility of reversing the recent defeat. Where fully 
rational analysis would lead a person to cut his losses, the use of 
the status quo as the benchmark against which other results are 
measured could lead the statesman to persevere even at high risk. 
The danger would be especially great if both sides were to feel 
39 This discussion is drawn from Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, "Prospect 
Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk," Ecotnometrica, LVII (I979), 263-29I; Tver- 
sky and Kahneman, "The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice," Science, 
CCXI (I98I), 453-458; Kahneman and Tversky, "Choices, Values, and Frames," American 
Psychologist, XXXIX (I984), 341-350; Tversky and Kahneman, "Rational Choice and the 
Framing of Decisions," Journal of Business, LIX (I986), S25 I-S278. 
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that they were losing, which could easily happen because they 
probably would have different perspectives and use different base- 
lines. Indeed, if the Russians consider the status quo to be constant 
movement in their favor, they might be prone to take high risks 
when the United States thought that it was maintaining the status 
quo. Furthermore, it could prove dangerous to follow a strategy 
of making gains by fait accompli.40 Unless the state which has 
been victimized quickly adjusts to and accepts the new situation, 
it may be willing to run unusually high risks to regain its previous 
position. The other side, expecting the first to be "rational," will 
in turn be taken by surprise by this resistance, with obvious 
possibilities for increased conflict. 
A second consequence is that if a statesman thinks that war- 
and therefore enormous loss-is almost certain if he does not 
strike and that attacking provides a small chance of escaping 
unscathed, he may decide to strike even though a standard prob- 
ability-utility calculus would call for restraint. Focusing on the 
losses that will certainly occur if his state is attacked can lead a 
decision-maker to pursue any course of action that holds out any 
possibility of no casualties at all. Similar and more likely are the 
dynamics which could operate in less severe crises, such as the 
expectation of a hostile coup in an important third-world country 
or the limited use of force by the adversary in a disputed area. 
Under such circumstances, the state might take actions which 
entailed an irrationally high chance of escalation and destruction 
in order to avoid the certain loss entailed by acquiescing.41 With 
his attention riveted on the deterioration which will occur unless 
he acts strongly to reverse a situation, a statesman may accept the 
risk of even greater loss, thereby making these crises more dan- 
gerous. 
The response can also be influenced by how the decision is 
framed. Although a powerful aversion to losses could lead a 
decision-maker to strike when the alternatives are posed as they 
were in the previous example, it also could lead him to hold back. 
For instance, he might choose restraint if he thought that striking 
first, although preferable to striking second, would lead to certain 
40 See George and Smoke, Deterrence, 536-540. 
4I States may try to gain the bargaining advantages that come from seeming to be 
irrational, as Quester reminds us ("Crises and the Unexpected," 703-706). 
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retaliation whereas not striking would offer some chance-even 
if small-of avoiding a war, although he risked much higher 
casualties if the other side attacked. If a decision-maker takes as 
his baseline not the existing situation, but the casualties that would 
be suffered in a war, his choice between the same alternatives 
might be different. He would then judge the policies according 
to lives that might be saved, not lost, with the result that he 
would choose a course of action that he believed would certainly 
save some lives rather than choose another that might save more, 
but might not save any. The obvious danger is that a first strike 
which would significantly reduce the other side's strategic forces 
would meet the former criterion whereas restraint could not pro- 
vide the certainty of saving any lives and so would not seem as 
attractive as standard utility maximization theory implies. 
But the picture is not one of unrelieved gloom. First, situa- 
tions as bleak as those we are positing are extremely rare and 
probably will never occur. The Cuban missile crisis was probably 
as close as we have come to the brink of war, and even then 
President John F. Kennedy rated the chance of war at no more 
than 50 percent, and he seems to have been referring to the chances 
or armed conflict, not nuclear war. So American, and presumably 
Soviet, officials were far from believing that war was inevitable. 
Second, the propensity for people to avoid value trade-offs 
can help to preserve peace. To face the choice between starting 
World War III and running a very high risk that the other side 
will strike first would be terribly painful, and decision-makers 
might avoid it by downplaying the latter danger. Of course to 
say that a decision-maker will try not to perceive the need for 
such a sharp value trade-off does not tell us which consideration 
will guide him, but some evidence indicates that the dominating 
value may be the one which is most salient and to which the 
person was committed even before the possibility of conflict with 
another central value arose. Thus the very fact that decision- 
makers constantly reiterate the need to avoid war and rarely talk 
about the need to strike first if war becomes inevitable may 
contribute to restraint. 
Finally, although exaggerating the danger of crisis instability 
would make a severe confrontation more dangerous than it would 
otherwise be, it also would serve the useful function of keeping 
states far from the brink of war. If decision-makers believed that 
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crises could be controlled and manipulated, they would be less 
inhibited about creating them. The misperception may be useful: 
fear, even unjustified fear, may make the world a little more 
tranquil. 
CONCLUSION The methodological problems noted earlier make 
it impossible to draw firm generalizations about the relationships 
between war and misperception, but we tentatively offer a num- 
ber of propositions. First, although war can occur in the absence 
of misperception, in fact misperception almost always accompan- 
ies it. To say that statesmen's beliefs about both capabilities and 
intentions are usually badly flawed is not to say that they are 
foolish. Rather, errors are inevitable in light of the difficulty of 
assessing technological and organizational capabilities, the obsta- 
cles to inferring others' intentions correctly, the limitations on 
people's abilities to process information, and the need to avoid 
excessively painful choices. 
Second, to say that misperceptions are common is not to 
specify their content. Statesmen can either overestimate or un- 
derestimate the other side's capabilities and its hostility. Wars are 
especially likely to occur when a state simultaneously underesti- 
mates an adversary's strength and exaggerates its hostility. In 
many cases, however, estimates of capabilities are the product of 
a policy, not the foundation on which it is built. Policy commit- 
ments can influence evaluations as well as be driven by them. 
Others' hostility can also be overestimated or underestimated and, 
although exceptions abound, the former error seems more com- 
mon than the latter. Similarly, more often than falling into the 
trap of incorrectly believing that other statesmen are just like 
themselves, decision-makers frequently fail to empathize with the 
adversary. That is, they tend to pay insufficient attention to con- 
straints and pressures faced by their opponent, including those 
generated by the decision-maker's own state. 
Third, objective analyses of the international system which 
are so popular among political scientists are not likely to provide 
a complete explanation for the outbreak of most wars. To histo- 
rians who are accustomed to explanations which rely heavily on 
reconstructing the world as the statesmen saw it, this reality will 
not come as a surprise. But I would also argue that such recon- 
structions can both build and utilize generalizations about how 
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people perceive information. Although some perceptions are ran- 
dom and idiosyncratic, many others are not. We know that de- 
cision-makers, like people in their everyday lives, are strongly 
driven by the beliefs that they hold, the lessons that they have 
learned from history, and the hope of being able to avoid painful 
choices. 
Even if these generalizations are correct, any single case can 
be an exception. World War III, if it occurs, might not fit the 
dominant pattern. But, given the overwhelming destruction 
which both sides would expect such a war to bring, it seems hard 
to see how such a confict could erupt in the absence of misper- 
ception. It would be particularly dangerous if either the United 
States or the Soviet Union or both believed that war was inevi- 
table and that striking first was significantly preferable to allowing 
the other side to strike first. Since a number of psychological 
processes could lead people to overestimate these factors, it is 
particularly important for statesmen to realize the ways in which 
commono perceptual processes can lead to conclusions that are not 
only incorrect, but also extremely dangerous. 
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